Bulletguy Posted October 31, 2018 Share Posted October 31, 2018 A very powerful and damning documentary on BBC2 last night which told of five fires all bearing similarities to Grenfell in use of flammable materials including cladding, yet happened before Grenfell. The programme focuses on three factors: the application of flammable material and cladding to buildings, the 'stay put' advice given by fire services, the absence of sprinklers - and how they contributed to each of the previous five blazes, sometimes with fatal consequences. Made over the course of 12 months, the film tells the story of the legislative history of building regulations from 1973 to the present day through five fires. A truly sickening indictment of government indifference, callousness and incompetence. On iplayer for anyone who missed it as it's certainly well worth watching. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b0bqjp75/the-fires-that-foretold-grenfell?suggid=b0bqjp75 Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest pelmetman Posted October 31, 2018 Share Posted October 31, 2018 Bulletguy - 2018-10-31 3:51 PM A very powerful and damning documentary on BBC2 last night which told of five fires all bearing similarities to Grenfell in use of flammable materials including cladding, yet happened before Grenfell. The programme focuses on three factors: the application of flammable material and cladding to buildings, the 'stay put' advice given by fire services, the absence of sprinklers - and how they contributed to each of the previous five blazes, sometimes with fatal consequences. Made over the course of 12 months, the film tells the story of the legislative history of building regulations from 1973 to the present day through five fires. A truly sickening indictment of government indifference, callousness and incompetence. On iplayer for anyone who missed it as it's certainly well worth watching. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b0bqjp75/the-fires-that-foretold-grenfell?suggid=b0bqjp75 ........and how many of the them were in a Tory run council? :-| ...... "The five fires revisited include the Summerland disaster, Douglas, Isle of Man (1973), Knowsley Heights fire, Liverpool (1991), Garnock Court fire, Irvine, N Ayrshire (1999), Harrow Court fire, Stevenage, Herts (2005), and Lakanal House, London (2009)." Just askin? ;-) ....... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
colin Posted October 31, 2018 Share Posted October 31, 2018 pelmetman - 2018-10-31 3:56 PM Bulletguy - 2018-10-31 3:51 PM A very powerful and damning documentary on BBC2 last night which told of five fires all bearing similarities to Grenfell in use of flammable materials including cladding, yet happened before Grenfell. The programme focuses on three factors: the application of flammable material and cladding to buildings, the 'stay put' advice given by fire services, the absence of sprinklers - and how they contributed to each of the previous five blazes, sometimes with fatal consequences. Made over the course of 12 months, the film tells the story of the legislative history of building regulations from 1973 to the present day through five fires. A truly sickening indictment of government indifference, callousness and incompetence. On iplayer for anyone who missed it as it's certainly well worth watching. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b0bqjp75/the-fires-that-foretold-grenfell?suggid=b0bqjp75 ........and how many of the them were in a Tory run council? :-| ...... "The five fires revisited include the Summerland disaster, Douglas, Isle of Man (1973), Knowsley Heights fire, Liverpool (1991), Garnock Court fire, Irvine, N Ayrshire (1999), Harrow Court fire, Stevenage, Herts (2005), and Lakanal House, London (2009)." Just askin? ;-) ....... As you have brought this up, the last coroners report was given to Eric Pickles, it contained many recommendations which would probably have prevented the loss of life at Grenfell, he ignored it. Funny enough several Labour MP's where on the program saying they hadn't done enough when in office. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Brian Kirby Posted October 31, 2018 Share Posted October 31, 2018 pelmetman - 2018-10-31 3:56 PM...……………….. ........and how many of the them were in a Tory run council? :-| ...... "The five fires revisited include the Summerland disaster, Douglas, Isle of Man (1973), Knowsley Heights fire, Liverpool (1991), Garnock Court fire, Irvine, N Ayrshire (1999), Harrow Court fire, Stevenage, Herts (2005), and Lakanal House, London (2009)." Just askin? ;-) ....... The Isle of Man in 1973 had its own building regulations. I have no idea of its politics. UK national bulding regulations were implemented under the Building Act 1984. In England they are made and issued by the secretary of state of the day as statutory instruments. The Welsh and Scottish assemblies have responsibility in those parte of the UK under devolved powers. Local councils have no control over their content, only having a role in approving applications. The actual approvals procedure has changed over time, and is now divided between competent persons (since 2002: self certifiers), approved inspectors (since 2010: private companies which can meet the required standards), and traditional local authority building control departments. Approvals for the schemes above (except IoM), would almost certainly have been through LA building control department. The approval procedure does not involve councillors, so it is extremely unlikely that the technical assessment of the application would have been subject to any political influence whatever. Nul points for seeking political influence, I'm afraid, Dave! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest pelmetman Posted October 31, 2018 Share Posted October 31, 2018 Brian Kirby - 2018-10-31 4:49 PM pelmetman - 2018-10-31 3:56 PM...……………….. ........and how many of the them were in a Tory run council? :-| ...... "The five fires revisited include the Summerland disaster, Douglas, Isle of Man (1973), Knowsley Heights fire, Liverpool (1991), Garnock Court fire, Irvine, N Ayrshire (1999), Harrow Court fire, Stevenage, Herts (2005), and Lakanal House, London (2009)." Just askin? ;-) ....... The Isle of Man in 1973 had its own building regulations. I have no idea of its politics. UK national bulding regulations were implemented under the Building Act 1984. In England they are made and issued by the secretary of state of the day as statutory instruments. The Welsh and Scottish assemblies have responsibility in those parte of the UK under devolved powers. Local councils have no control over their content, only having a role in approving applications. The actual approvals procedure has changed over time, and is now divided between competent persons (since 2002: self certifiers), approved inspectors (since 2010: private companies which can meet the required standards), and traditional local authority building control departments. Approvals for the schemes above (except IoM), would almost certainly have been through LA building control department. The approval procedure does not involve councillors, so it is extremely unlikely that the technical assessment of the application would have been subject to any political influence whatever. Nul points for seeking political influence, I'm afraid, Dave! Best point that out to our resident Tory haters Brian..........ie Bullet and John52/Peter/James :D ...... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bulletguy Posted October 31, 2018 Author Share Posted October 31, 2018 Brian Kirby - 2018-10-31 4:49 PM pelmetman - 2018-10-31 3:56 PM...……………….. ........and how many of the them were in a Tory run council? :-| ...... "The five fires revisited include the Summerland disaster, Douglas, Isle of Man (1973), Knowsley Heights fire, Liverpool (1991), Garnock Court fire, Irvine, N Ayrshire (1999), Harrow Court fire, Stevenage, Herts (2005), and Lakanal House, London (2009)." Just askin? ;-) ....... The Isle of Man in 1973 had its own building regulations. I have no idea of its politics. UK national bulding regulations were implemented under the Building Act 1984. In England they are made and issued by the secretary of state of the day as statutory instruments. The Welsh and Scottish assemblies have responsibility in those parte of the UK under devolved powers. Local councils have no control over their content, only having a role in approving applications. The actual approvals procedure has changed over time, and is now divided between competent persons (since 2002: self certifiers), approved inspectors (since 2010: private companies which can meet the required standards), and traditional local authority building control departments. Approvals for the schemes above (except IoM), would almost certainly have been through LA building control department. The approval procedure does not involve councillors, so it is extremely unlikely that the technical assessment of the application would have been subject to any political influence whatever. Nul points for seeking political influence, I'm afraid, Dave! Well said Brian. If you missed it i'd definitely give it a watch as i'd be interested in reading your opinion. There was a part which told how building regulations were reduced from over 300 pages to just 26 called Approved Document B. Part of what was dispensed with....cladding was not required to be fireproof. The FBU also called for sprinklers to be retro fitted in all tower blocks...but were ignored. A lawyer described Document B as "impenetrable and ambiguous". Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bulletguy Posted October 31, 2018 Author Share Posted October 31, 2018 colin - 2018-10-31 4:08 PM pelmetman - 2018-10-31 3:56 PM Bulletguy - 2018-10-31 3:51 PM A very powerful and damning documentary on BBC2 last night which told of five fires all bearing similarities to Grenfell in use of flammable materials including cladding, yet happened before Grenfell. The programme focuses on three factors: the application of flammable material and cladding to buildings, the 'stay put' advice given by fire services, the absence of sprinklers - and how they contributed to each of the previous five blazes, sometimes with fatal consequences. Made over the course of 12 months, the film tells the story of the legislative history of building regulations from 1973 to the present day through five fires. A truly sickening indictment of government indifference, callousness and incompetence. On iplayer for anyone who missed it as it's certainly well worth watching. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b0bqjp75/the-fires-that-foretold-grenfell?suggid=b0bqjp75 ........and how many of the them were in a Tory run council? :-| ...... "The five fires revisited include the Summerland disaster, Douglas, Isle of Man (1973), Knowsley Heights fire, Liverpool (1991), Garnock Court fire, Irvine, N Ayrshire (1999), Harrow Court fire, Stevenage, Herts (2005), and Lakanal House, London (2009)." Just askin? ;-) ....... As you have brought this up, the last coroners report was given to Eric Pickles, it contained many recommendations which would probably have prevented the loss of life at Grenfell, he ignored it. Funny enough several Labour MP's were on the program saying they hadn't done enough when in office. Correct Colin.......and not one Tory MP had the guts to appear whose absence was glaringly noticeable.....yet Grenfell occurred on their watch. You obviously watched the documentary where the poster you replied to hasn't and undoubtedly won't view it. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Brian Kirby Posted November 1, 2018 Share Posted November 1, 2018 Bulletguy - 2018-10-31 6:40 PM Brian Kirby - 2018-10-31 4:49 PM pelmetman - 2018-10-31 3:56 PM...……………….. ........and how many of the them were in a Tory run council? :-| ...... "The five fires revisited include the Summerland disaster, Douglas, Isle of Man (1973), Knowsley Heights fire, Liverpool (1991), Garnock Court fire, Irvine, N Ayrshire (1999), Harrow Court fire, Stevenage, Herts (2005), and Lakanal House, London (2009)." Just askin? ;-) ....... The Isle of Man in 1973 had its own building regulations. I have no idea of its politics. UK national bulding regulations were implemented under the Building Act 1984. In England they are made and issued by the secretary of state of the day as statutory instruments. The Welsh and Scottish assemblies have responsibility in those parte of the UK under devolved powers. Local councils have no control over their content, only having a role in approving applications. The actual approvals procedure has changed over time, and is now divided between competent persons (since 2002: self certifiers), approved inspectors (since 2010: private companies which can meet the required standards), and traditional local authority building control departments. Approvals for the schemes above (except IoM), would almost certainly have been through LA building control department. The approval procedure does not involve councillors, so it is extremely unlikely that the technical assessment of the application would have been subject to any political influence whatever. Nul points for seeking political influence, I'm afraid, Dave! Well said Brian. If you missed it i'd definitely give it a watch as i'd be interested in reading your opinion. There was a part which told how building regulations were reduced from over 300 pages to just 26 called Approved Document B. Part of what was dispensed with....cladding was not required to be fireproof. The FBU also called for sprinklers to be retro fitted in all tower blocks...but were ignored. A lawyer described Document B as "impenetrable and ambiguous". We recorded it, and have now watched it. I have a number of criticisms of the programme, mainly that it plays on emotion at the expense of fact. Summerland was horrific, but one factor sticks in my mind from the time. The technical press was full of it, and much time was spent trying to get to the root cause of the rapid fire spread. What emerged, from memory, was that the Oroglass modules were designed as rooflights, for which use they met the necessary fire safety regulations. The designers (and presumably the approval authority) took as indicating that they were "safe", so used them en-mass to form a wall and a continuous skylight. They had not been fire tested in that configuration until the fire dramatically, and tragically, demonstrated the risk. It is somewhat surprising that so large a building, designed to accommodate several thousand people, had not been sprinklered, and it is possible that sprinklers may have slowed the spread. However, to get the sprinkler heads into the right places to deal with a fire in the outside wall/roof would have required prior knowledge of the risk the Oroglass presented, which, as above, had not been identified. The final factor I recall was that the fire escapes were subsequently judged inadequate. Much of this relates to the regulations that had been imposed on the largest building, unique of its type, on the IoM, and the level of experience and understanding of the risks it presented the local authority had at its disposal. It is not, in that respect, IMO, truly a pre-cursor to Grenfell, though it was undoubtedly a very serious fire that led to loss of life. This was also before the Building Act 1984, so should not be compared to Grenfell which , along with all the others, came under its provisions. I’m surprised that lawyers found the regulations excessively complex. There is a common mistake made in reading the Approved Documents, in that while they re-state the actual regulation, they are not in themselves the regulations. The Approved Documents are in sections, numbered from A to L. Section B deals with fire. It is in two volumes, and the relevant volume alone has 166 pages. The actual regulation is B4, which states: “B4: External Fire Spread. B4. (1) The external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of the building. (2) The roof of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the roof of the building and from one building to another, having regard to the use and position of the building.” I don’t see where ambiguity or confusion lies in that! What then follows are various, “deemed to satisfy”, ways to meet that requirement. Where a deemed to satisfy solution doesn’t fit the case, a full scale mock up must be fire tested. I cannot understand why this was not done at Grenfell, but it seems decisions were being taken by inadequately qualified (or unqualified), people. I do not understand either how that could have happened, or why whoever gave approval did not identify the flaws in the materials selected. This is something the public enquiry must identify. Of the other fires, what was not revealed was what actual materiels had been used. References to “plastic” are not helpful. The subsequent fire reports should have identified exactly what had caused the fires to spread externally. It is obvious that flammability was the main factor, but who had installed the flammable materials, though this must have been identified at the time, was not revealed. This seems fundamental, and I wonder why it was not stated. If I remember, Garnock Court had mineral wool insulation behind the cladding, which should have been completely non-flammable, yet it seems to have burned. No-one said why, yet again, this must have been investigated at the time. Odd. What became clear from Lackanal House is that quite major internal alterations had been carried out, and that double glazed windows with PVC frames had been installed. This can only have been done by Southwark Council which, inexplicably, seems not to have involved its own Building Control department. As was stated, the internal modifications breached the fire compartments originally incorporated into the design, allowing the fire to spread (though not, apparently via external cladding as with Grenfell). In doing this, the established escape and evacuation regime was destroyed. Again, the fire report on that fire should have identified how this came about. Yet, again, no mention of its findings. The criticism of the stay put instruction was, in my opinion, unhelpful, in that the implied culprit was the fire brigade. It used to be the case that Fire Officers made periodic visits to large buildings on their patch, to ensure that fire doors were in order, extinguishers within date, hoses in good condition, escape routes free from rubbish and obstructions etc. etc. This requirement was withdrawn some time back by government in order to save money. Large residential buildings are designed, as was stated, on the basis that each residential unit becomes a fire compartment. Their training is based on this requirement being maintained during the life of the building and, if it is changed, that they are informed and can adopt different procedures. It is clear in all these cases that the brigade’s understanding of the actual risks posed by the altered buildings was inadequate. You can’t fairly blame the policy, or those responsible for carrying it out, if it has been rendered inappropriate by others who should know better. My reading is that too many amendments have been introduced in pursuit of eliminating “costly red tape”, by people wholly inadequate to make such decisions. From the trail of visible evidence left in their wake, it is also clear to me that they failed to seek, or heed, properly qualified advice before doing so. This has all the hall marks to me, of dogma led political arrogance. A number of people, not least the ministers responsible, carry the responsibility for these incidents. Whether it would be reasonable to identify and charge them, or whether it would be better to constrain their activities to what they properly understand, is a moot point. But, the true responsibility lies at the top (of central and local government), not down among the fire fighters, for having made reckless changes without sufficient consideration as to their consequences. For instance, did you know that there is, and never has been, a formal qualification to become a building control officer, of for any alternative qualification to be held by people performing this function? How can that be? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bulletguy Posted November 1, 2018 Author Share Posted November 1, 2018 Long read Brian and am out for a few hours so will read later and get back to you on it when back. Glad you viewed....always good to have some informative views! ;-) Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bulletguy Posted November 1, 2018 Author Share Posted November 1, 2018 Brian Kirby - 2018-11-01 10:58 AM Bulletguy - 2018-10-31 6:40 PM Brian Kirby - 2018-10-31 4:49 PM pelmetman - 2018-10-31 3:56 PM...……………….. ........and how many of the them were in a Tory run council? :-| ...... "The five fires revisited include the Summerland disaster, Douglas, Isle of Man (1973), Knowsley Heights fire, Liverpool (1991), Garnock Court fire, Irvine, N Ayrshire (1999), Harrow Court fire, Stevenage, Herts (2005), and Lakanal House, London (2009)." Just askin? ;-) ....... The Isle of Man in 1973 had its own building regulations. I have no idea of its politics. UK national bulding regulations were implemented under the Building Act 1984. In England they are made and issued by the secretary of state of the day as statutory instruments. The Welsh and Scottish assemblies have responsibility in those parte of the UK under devolved powers. Local councils have no control over their content, only having a role in approving applications. The actual approvals procedure has changed over time, and is now divided between competent persons (since 2002: self certifiers), approved inspectors (since 2010: private companies which can meet the required standards), and traditional local authority building control departments. Approvals for the schemes above (except IoM), would almost certainly have been through LA building control department. The approval procedure does not involve councillors, so it is extremely unlikely that the technical assessment of the application would have been subject to any political influence whatever. Nul points for seeking political influence, I'm afraid, Dave! Well said Brian. If you missed it i'd definitely give it a watch as i'd be interested in reading your opinion. There was a part which told how building regulations were reduced from over 300 pages to just 26 called Approved Document B. Part of what was dispensed with....cladding was not required to be fireproof. The FBU also called for sprinklers to be retro fitted in all tower blocks...but were ignored. A lawyer described Document B as "impenetrable and ambiguous". We recorded it, and have now watched it. I have a number of criticisms of the programme, mainly that it plays on emotion at the expense of fact. Summerland was horrific, but one factor sticks in my mind from the time. The technical press was full of it, and much time was spent trying to get to the root cause of the rapid fire spread. What emerged, from memory, was that the Oroglass modules were designed as rooflights, for which use they met the necessary fire safety regulations. The designers (and presumably the approval authority) took as indicating that they were "safe", so used them en-mass to form a wall and a continuous skylight. They had not been fire tested in that configuration until the fire dramatically, and tragically, demonstrated the risk. It is somewhat surprising that so large a building, designed to accommodate several thousand people, had not been sprinklered, and it is possible that sprinklers may have slowed the spread. However, to get the sprinkler heads into the right places to deal with a fire in the outside wall/roof would have required prior knowledge of the risk the Oroglass presented, which, as above, had not been identified. The final factor I recall was that the fire escapes were subsequently judged inadequate. Much of this relates to the regulations that had been imposed on the largest building, unique of its type, on the IoM, and the level of experience and understanding of the risks it presented the local authority had at its disposal. It is not, in that respect, IMO, truly a pre-cursor to Grenfell, though it was undoubtedly a very serious fire that led to loss of life. This was also before the Building Act 1984, so should not be compared to Grenfell which , along with all the others, came under its provisions. I’m surprised that lawyers found the regulations excessively complex. There is a common mistake made in reading the Approved Documents, in that while they re-state the actual regulation, they are not in themselves the regulations. The Approved Documents are in sections, numbered from A to L. Section B deals with fire. It is in two volumes, and the relevant volume alone has 166 pages. The actual regulation is B4, which states: “B4: External Fire Spread. B4. (1) The external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of the building. (2) The roof of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the roof of the building and from one building to another, having regard to the use and position of the building.” I don’t see where ambiguity or confusion lies in that! What then follows are various, “deemed to satisfy”, ways to meet that requirement. Where a deemed to satisfy solution doesn’t fit the case, a full scale mock up must be fire tested. I cannot understand why this was not done at Grenfell, but it seems decisions were being taken by inadequately qualified (or unqualified), people. I do not understand either how that could have happened, or why whoever gave approval did not identify the flaws in the materials selected. This is something the public enquiry must identify. Of the other fires, what was not revealed was what actual materiels had been used. References to “plastic” are not helpful. The subsequent fire reports should have identified exactly what had caused the fires to spread externally. It is obvious that flammability was the main factor, but who had installed the flammable materials, though this must have been identified at the time, was not revealed. This seems fundamental, and I wonder why it was not stated. If I remember, Garnock Court had mineral wool insulation behind the cladding, which should have been completely non-flammable, yet it seems to have burned. No-one said why, yet again, this must have been investigated at the time. Odd. What became clear from Lackanal House is that quite major internal alterations had been carried out, and that double glazed windows with PVC frames had been installed. This can only have been done by Southwark Council which, inexplicably, seems not to have involved its own Building Control department. As was stated, the internal modifications breached the fire compartments originally incorporated into the design, allowing the fire to spread (though not, apparently via external cladding as with Grenfell). In doing this, the established escape and evacuation regime was destroyed. Again, the fire report on that fire should have identified how this came about. Yet, again, no mention of its findings. The criticism of the stay put instruction was, in my opinion, unhelpful, in that the implied culprit was the fire brigade. It used to be the case that Fire Officers made periodic visits to large buildings on their patch, to ensure that fire doors were in order, extinguishers within date, hoses in good condition, escape routes free from rubbish and obstructions etc. etc. This requirement was withdrawn some time back by government in order to save money. Large residential buildings are designed, as was stated, on the basis that each residential unit becomes a fire compartment. Their training is based on this requirement being maintained during the life of the building and, if it is changed, that they are informed and can adopt different procedures. It is clear in all these cases that the brigade’s understanding of the actual risks posed by the altered buildings was inadequate. You can’t fairly blame the policy, or those responsible for carrying it out, if it has been rendered inappropriate by others who should know better. My reading is that too many amendments have been introduced in pursuit of eliminating “costly red tape”, by people wholly inadequate to make such decisions. From the trail of visible evidence left in their wake, it is also clear to me that they failed to seek, or heed, properly qualified advice before doing so. This has all the hall marks to me, of dogma led political arrogance. A number of people, not least the ministers responsible, carry the responsibility for these incidents. Whether it would be reasonable to identify and charge them, or whether it would be better to constrain their activities to what they properly understand, is a moot point. But, the true responsibility lies at the top (of central and local government), not down among the fire fighters, for having made reckless changes without sufficient consideration as to their consequences. For instance, did you know that there is, and never has been, a formal qualification to become a building control officer, of for any alternative qualification to be held by people performing this function? How can that be? Brian.....I never knew about Summerland in fact that programme was the first time i'd heard of the place, though i'd have been 23 at the time so should have remembered it. Looking at it from a non-professional view, (ie not an architect, never worked with the fire service, and not been involved with council planning) the first thing which struck me was the tiny little entrance/exit door into what was a massive building. For a building of the early 70's that seemed ludicrous to me as during the same period, i was going to night clubs which held maybe 200 at a max with far bigger entrance/exit points.....one i remember had six double doors virtually the width of the building front. Summerland's entrance wouldn't have looked out of place on a domestic property! I had a look on Google and Oroglas is still made. All i could find out about it was it's made of acrylic and sourced this; What are the Disadvantages of Acrylic? Acrylic has relatively low impact resistance and strength in general. Polycarbonate is a better choice for highly demanding applications. Acrylic isn’t very strong and experiences brittle failure, meaning it cracks immediately without much bending. So not really the most ideal substance to use as a roof cover.....as mh'ers will know from Heki rooflights which 'weather', as do the hinges, from years of hot sun and eventually go brittle IF you've been lucky enough not to have it crack or split before! But at least that's just a vent and not an entire roof! Oroglas has a Heat Deflection Temperature of 95°C and Melt Temperature 130°C. That melt temp is very low so just a small fire would easily finish it off. Whilst not specifically a pre-cursor to Grenfell, it does beg the question as to why lessons were not learned and we carried on wrapping buildings in flammable material. I mean, was it really such a great idea to stick an acrylic roof and front on a building holding thousands of people? I don't think so.....it seems pretty mental to me! Which was it that got reduced from 300+ pages to 26? I thought it was Approved Document B? Or was it the entire building regs? Either way it seems pretty severe. My only experience of a serious fire was where i used to work. I was on nights and felt an earth tremour...only slight but knew i'd felt 'something'. But nobody else bothered and carried on working until minutes later the night foreman told us we might have to evacuate as he'd had report of an explosion in one of the blocks. That was the 'tremour' i'd felt. A few of us went out to look and i've never seen anything quite so horrific. One of the powder cells had caught fire (those are right alongside where the 'live' ammunition is loaded). The explosion had taken the roof off which it was designed to do and flames were shooting 20 metres up, but what should not have happened.....it blew a heavy metal blast proof door off it's hinges and sent it flying where it was eventually found 200 metres away down a railway embankment. The powder in each cell room was in a single canister approx the size of 5ltr paint can which gives some idea of how little explosive is required to do that much damage. Fortunately nobody was working in that block at the time otherwise we'd certainly have had some causalities, if not deaths. The H&S inquiry went on for months. Brian Kirby - 2018-11-01 10:58 AM My reading is that too many amendments have been introduced in pursuit of eliminating “costly red tape”, by people wholly inadequate to make such decisions. From the trail of visible evidence left in their wake, it is also clear to me that they failed to seek, or heed, properly qualified advice before doing so. This has all the hall marks to me, of dogma led political arrogance. A number of people, not least the ministers responsible, carry the responsibility for these incidents. Whether it would be reasonable to identify and charge them, or whether it would be better to constrain their activities to what they properly understand, is a moot point. But, the true responsibility lies at the top (of central and local government), not down among the fire fighters, for having made reckless changes without sufficient consideration as to their consequences. For instance, did you know that there is, and never has been, a formal qualification to become a building control officer, of for any alternative qualification to be held by people performing this function? How can that be? I agree with you on this but feel there has to be much more accountability. 72 people lost their lives in Grenfell which from what i've seen so far was avoidable. Council and government had built a bonfire which was a ticking time bomb. Moreover they'd had prior warnings from concerned residents......but they were dismissed and not listened to. They were 'just residents'. The inquiry needs to start at the very top.....and only gradually work down. Those 'at the top' should face serious custodial sentences. There is no alternative in my book. Had their been any deaths as a result of that fire i mentioned at my workplace, the works Director would have been instantly dismissed and handed a custodial sentence....even though he wasn't on the premises at the time it occurred. And yes it can, and does happen because one got kicked off back in the early 80's though over a different matter.....theft. He served two years which was pathetic given the level of seriousness. I didn't know about what you last mentioned, re. no formal qualification required/building control officer. That seems utter insanity to me. What sort of salary does that position command? Quite a lot more than a supermarket shelf stacker or assistant in a chip shop.....so why not give them the job?!! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
colin Posted November 1, 2018 Share Posted November 1, 2018 Bulletguy - 2018-11-01 8:55 PM I didn't know about what you last mentioned, re. no formal qualification required/building control officer. That seems utter insanity to me. Back in the day I was given the job of designing transport cradles for part built Guided Weapons between armouries. At the time the UK regs where very sketchy, so I decided to look up US regs to see if there where any better guidelines, I then found that the second armoury which had just been built was by US standards too close to a fuel station and a factory. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Brian Kirby Posted November 2, 2018 Share Posted November 2, 2018 Bulletguy - 2018-11-01 8:55 PM....................Brian.....I never knew about Summerland in fact that programme was the first time i'd heard of the place, though i'd have been 23 at the time so should have remembered it. Looking at it from a non-professional view, (ie not an architect, never worked with the fire service, and not been involved with council planning) the first thing which struck me was the tiny little entrance/exit door into what was a massive building. ……………….. But, the entrance is not, generally, treated as a means of escape. The designated emergency escapes are supposed to be sized to evacuate the whole population of the building within a designated (depending on size/use) time. From memory, the enquiry identified inadequate escapes. However, the P/A system was advising people to stay put, which delayed the eventual mass evacuation. The fire was 1973 remember, so allowing for design and construction time, and that the building had opened two years earlier, the design concepts and regulatory framework would have been those of the mid to late 60's. There were no national building regulations then, and I assume whatever regulations Douglas had would have been issued as local byelaws. I had a look on Google and Oroglas is still made. All i could find out about it was it's made of acrylic and sourced this; What are the Disadvantages of Acrylic? Acrylic has relatively low impact resistance and strength in general. Polycarbonate is a better choice for highly demanding applications. …………….. Yes, but a) I don't think polycarbonate was an option in the 60's, and b) the designers would only have had access to whatever printed material they could source in specifying the materials. This was way back before the internet, when designers had only libraries of printed material in the form of manufacturer's catalogues. I think they were completely unaware of the risk the acrylic posed, and would probably not have contemplated that a wooden shed would have been sited against the external wall of the building to become the eventual source of the fire. Whilst not specifically a pre-cursor to Grenfell, it does beg the question as to why lessons were not learned and we carried on wrapping buildings in flammable material. ………………… Lessons were learned, and were incorporated into the 1984 Building Act, in the form of national building regulations. Which was it that got reduced from 300+ pages to 26? I thought it was Approved Document B? Or was it the entire building regs? Either way it seems pretty severe.……………………………… I have no idea what that comment referred to. I quoted the actual regulation on flame spread over external walls above. As I said, the relevant volume of Approved Document B Fire alone is 166 pages. Brian Kirby - 2018-11-01 10:58 AM My reading is that too many amendments have been introduced in pursuit of eliminating “costly red tape”, by people wholly inadequate to make such decisions. From the trail of visible evidence left in their wake, it is also clear to me that they failed to seek, or heed, properly qualified advice before doing so. This has all the hall marks to me, of dogma led political arrogance. A number of people, not least the ministers responsible, carry the responsibility for these incidents. Whether it would be reasonable to identify and charge them, or whether it would be better to constrain their activities to what they properly understand, is a moot point. But, the true responsibility lies at the top (of central and local government), not down among the fire fighters, for having made reckless changes without sufficient consideration as to their consequences. For instance, did you know that there is, and never has been, a formal qualification to become a building control officer, of for any alternative qualification to be held by people performing this function? How can that be? I agree with you on this but feel there has to be much more accountability. 72 people lost their lives in Grenfell which from what i've seen so far was avoidable. Council and government had built a bonfire which was a ticking time bomb. Moreover they'd had prior warnings from concerned residents......but they were dismissed and not listened to. They were 'just residents'. ……………………………. Re the warnings at Grenfell House, as I understand it the warnings from the residents related to a variety of issues, but did not identify the cladding as a fire risk. What astounds me is that RBKC's building control officers visited the site during construction and failed to flag up concerns over the nature of the cladding. To me, that is a far more serious shortcoming. Re the time bomb, it seems to me that the actual regulation is abundantly clear. However, the procedure for gaining approval has been changed by the creation of self certification schemes, which carry the danger that a tradesman may correctly certify what he uses and does, without understanding what impact his decision has on other parts of the building as a whole. I was intrigued at the reference to intense discussion over whether, for example, a window included in cladding (which is part of an external wall) should be treated as part of the cladding (and so subject to Regulation B4 as quoted above). If it is, it could not have a PVC frame, as PVC is flammable. If it is not, then it could have a PVC frame as it was in, but not part of, the external wall. Then think back to the film of Lackanal House (and others) in Southwark, and of the windows falling out because their PVC frames had melted. Then ask if the window man would have been likely to query whether his PVC frames would be deemed part of the external because the building exceeded 18 metres in height? I see these schemes as setting traps for the unwary, others seem them as elimination of costly and burdensome red tape. I didn't know about what you last mentioned, re. no formal qualification required/building control officer. That seems utter insanity to me. What sort of salary does that position command? Quite a lot more than a supermarket shelf stacker or assistant in a chip shop.....so why not give them the job?!! Maybe they did!! In March 2017 (so after a delay of 8 years!) Southwark council were fined just short of £500K over the fire safety deficiencies at Lackanal House. The case was brought, of all people, by the London Fire Brigade! How's that for bizarre? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bulletguy Posted November 2, 2018 Author Share Posted November 2, 2018 colin - 2018-11-01 9:21 PM Bulletguy - 2018-11-01 8:55 PM I didn't know about what you last mentioned, re. no formal qualification required/building control officer. That seems utter insanity to me. Back in the day I was given the job of designing transport cradles for part built Guided Weapons between armouries. At the time the UK regs where very sketchy, so I decided to look up US regs to see if there where any better guidelines, I then found that the second armoury which had just been built was by US standards too close to a fuel station and a factory. I couldn't list the number of crazy hazards at the factory i worked Colin but one example, one area section was prone to flooding after a downpour of rain due to poor design and neglect of the roof over the years. Bear in mind the place was rammed with machines running industrial voltage surrounded by millions of rounds of 'live' ammunition. We all wore special anti static PPE to avoid risk of 'sparking' around ammunition, the odds of that happening being so remote the odds would be in the billions.....yet here we were running industrial voltage machines in a block which got turned into a water feature every time it rained....and that was "ok". Utter madness. Though the main factory was built just before the war, that particular block was built in the 70's yet the old buildings were ok which begs the question....what was it we knew about building properly back in the late 30's, that we didn't in the 70's? Thankfully that building is no more and a brand new factory opened not long after i'd retired. Brian Kirby - 2018-11-02 12:29 PM Bulletguy - 2018-11-01 8:55 PM....................Brian.....I never knew about Summerland in fact that programme was the first time i'd heard of the place, though i'd have been 23 at the time so should have remembered it. Looking at it from a non-professional view, (ie not an architect, never worked with the fire service, and not been involved with council planning) the first thing which struck me was the tiny little entrance/exit door into what was a massive building. ……………….. But, the entrance is not, generally, treated as a means of escape. The designated emergency escapes are supposed to be sized to evacuate the whole population of the building within a designated (depending on size/use) time. From memory, the enquiry identified inadequate escapes. However, the P/A system was advising people to stay put, which delayed the eventual mass evacuation. The fire was 1973 remember, so allowing for design and construction time, and that the building had opened two years earlier, the design concepts and regulatory framework would have been those of the mid to late 60's. There were no national building regulations then, and I assume whatever regulations Douglas had would have been issued as local byelaws. I realise the entrance isn't the only escape....but was a means of in an emergency, though certainly didn't help being so tiny. Shoddy design ill thought out imo Brian. Probably cost peanuts to build but with the sole purpose of making vast profits. I had a look on Google and Oroglas is still made. All i could find out about it was it's made of acrylic and sourced this; What are the Disadvantages of Acrylic? Acrylic has relatively low impact resistance and strength in general. Polycarbonate is a better choice for highly demanding applications. …………….. Yes, but a) I don't think polycarbonate was an option in the 60's, and b) the designers would only have had access to whatever printed material they could source in specifying the materials. This was way back before the internet, when designers had only libraries of printed material in the form of manufacturer's catalogues. I think they were completely unaware of the risk the acrylic posed, and would probably not have contemplated that a wooden shed would have been sited against the external wall of the building to become the eventual source of the fire. No though it seems the trade had been extremely slow in developing it further. Polycarbonates were first discovered in 1898 by Alfred Einhorn, a German scientist working at the University of Munich. However, after 30 years of laboratory research, this class of materials was abandoned without commercialization. Research resumed in 1953, when Hermann Schnell at Bayer in Uerdingen, Germany patented the first linear polycarbonate. The brand name "Merlon" was registered in 1955, Later changed to Makrolon in the 1980s. Whilst not specifically a pre-cursor to Grenfell, it does beg the question as to why lessons were not learned and we carried on wrapping buildings in flammable material. ………………… Lessons were learned, and were incorporated into the 1984 Building Act, in the form of national building regulations. Which was it that got reduced from 300+ pages to 26? I thought it was Approved Document B? Or was it the entire building regs? Either way it seems pretty severe.……………………………… I have no idea what that comment referred to. I quoted the actual regulation on flame spread over external walls above. As I said, the relevant volume of Approved Document B Fire alone is 166 pages. Found it now by looking back on iPlayer. It's at 17min 40sec in about how Thatcher cut over 300 pages of building regs and reduced it down to just 26 pages in an effort to "cut red tape". Brian Kirby - 2018-11-01 10:58 AM My reading is that too many amendments have been introduced in pursuit of eliminating “costly red tape”, by people wholly inadequate to make such decisions. From the trail of visible evidence left in their wake, it is also clear to me that they failed to seek, or heed, properly qualified advice before doing so. This has all the hall marks to me, of dogma led political arrogance. A number of people, not least the ministers responsible, carry the responsibility for these incidents. Whether it would be reasonable to identify and charge them, or whether it would be better to constrain their activities to what they properly understand, is a moot point. But, the true responsibility lies at the top (of central and local government), not down among the fire fighters, for having made reckless changes without sufficient consideration as to their consequences. For instance, did you know that there is, and never has been, a formal qualification to become a building control officer, of for any alternative qualification to be held by people performing this function? How can that be? I agree with you on this but feel there has to be much more accountability. 72 people lost their lives in Grenfell which from what i've seen so far was avoidable. Council and government had built a bonfire which was a ticking time bomb. Moreover they'd had prior warnings from concerned residents......but they were dismissed and not listened to. They were 'just residents'. ……………………………. Re the warnings at Grenfell House, as I understand it the warnings from the residents related to a variety of issues, but did not identify the cladding as a fire risk. What astounds me is that RBKC's building control officers visited the site during construction and failed to flag up concerns over the nature of the cladding. To me, that is a far more serious shortcoming. Re the time bomb, it seems to me that the actual regulation is abundantly clear. However, the procedure for gaining approval has been changed by the creation of self certification schemes, which carry the danger that a tradesman may correctly certify what he uses and does, without understanding what impact his decision has on other parts of the building as a whole. I was intrigued at the reference to intense discussion over whether, for example, a window included in cladding (which is part of an external wall) should be treated as part of the cladding (and so subject to Regulation B4 as quoted above). If it is, it could not have a PVC frame, as PVC is flammable. If it is not, then it could have a PVC frame as it was in, but not part of, the external wall. Then think back to the film of Lackanal House (and others) in Southwark, and of the windows falling out because their PVC frames had melted. Then ask if the window man would have been likely to query whether his PVC frames would be deemed part of the external because the building exceeded 18 metres in height? I see these schemes as setting traps for the unwary, others seem them as elimination of costly and burdensome red tape. I didn't know about what you last mentioned, re. no formal qualification required/building control officer. That seems utter insanity to me. What sort of salary does that position command? Quite a lot more than a supermarket shelf stacker or assistant in a chip shop.....so why not give them the job?!! Maybe they did!! In March 2017 (so after a delay of 8 years!) Southwark council were fined just short of £500K over the fire safety deficiencies at Lackanal House. The case was brought, of all people, by the London Fire Brigade! How's that for bizarre? I just hope the 'new' resurrected Grenfell has been designed by burger flippers and shelf stackers then as it's obvious they'd make a better job. No job losses needed either. The architects, designers, and building control officers from RKBC can get to work in Maccy D's and Asda! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Brian Kirby Posted November 3, 2018 Share Posted November 3, 2018 Bulletguy - 2018-11-02 8:43 PM ……………………..I realise the entrance isn't the only escape....but was a means of in an emergency, though certainly didn't help being so tiny. Shoddy design ill thought out imo Brian. Probably cost peanuts to build but with the sole purpose of making vast profits. I think you’re using today’s knowledge to judge the past! ?? The building was commissioned by the Douglas Corporation in the early 60’s, and designed by a local architect with no experience of such buildings. He could not have had that experience, as his concept for the building was new and untried. It is easy to identify its actual shortcomings in hindsight, but I doubt anyone could have foreseen them at the time. Today, when assessing the number and size of emergency escapes the main entrance is discounted, and the other exits provided according to an established code. I doubt if the Douglas authorities or the designers had adequate guidance. I think they did their best, which tragically turned out to be inadequate. I had a look on Google and Oroglas is still made. …………………………….. I think this is also somewhat judges the past against today’s knowledge. At the time Summerland was being designed, polycarbonate rooflights were not available. The fatal design error was to construct a wall using a product that was deemed safe when used horizontally. No one involved foresaw the risk that posed. Sometimes, for a risk to become apparent, it must materialise. Everyone then learns. I think this was one of those cases. Whilst not specifically a pre-cursor to Grenfell, it does beg the question as to why lessons were not learned and we carried on wrapping buildings in flammable material. ………………… Lessons were learned, and were incorporated into the 1984 Building Act, in the form of national building regulations. Since then they have been subject to various changes, and I think the Grenfell fire probably points to some of those changes being extremely ill judged. Which was it that got reduced from 300+ pages to 26? I thought it was Approved Document B? Or was it the entire building regs? Either way it seems pretty severe.……………………………… I have no idea what that comment referred to. I quoted the actual regulation on flame spread over external walls above. As I said, the relevant volume of Approved Document B Fire alone is 166 pages. Found it now by looking back on iPlayer. It's at 17min 40sec in about how Thatcher cut over 300 pages of building regs and reduced it down to just 26 pages in an effort to "cut red tape". Missed that, but I have no idea which regulations those might have been. I suspect the 26 pages is probably a reference to the Building Regulations, introduced under the 1984 Building Act. It is probably a reference to SI 2214, the latest version of which is 2010, at 55 pages long. Those are the actual regulations applicable to the refurbishment of Grenfell. ……………………….I agree with you on this but feel there has to be much more accountability. 72 people lost their lives in Grenfell which from what i've seen so far was avoidable. Council and government had built a bonfire which was a ticking time bomb. ……………. I think the Grenfell fire was more than avoidable, I think it was legally impossible. I think that the responsibility lies almost exclusively with RBKC, with central government sharing some of the blame. RKBC is a larger, better resourced borough than was Douglas in the 1960’s. It has more, better informed, staff, yet seems not to have used them, or possibly not listened to them. I remain incredulous that the materials used at Grenfell were permitted or, if not permitted, that inferior substitutes were used and not spotted. For me, all the other issues are secondary. Without that disastrous combination of cladding and insulation, notwithstanding the other safety deficiencies, I really don’t think the initial fire could have spread from the flat where it started. Based on what I have read so far, I’m absolutely clear that it was the insulated cladding, and that alone, that allowed the fire to envelop the building as it did. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
antony1969 Posted November 3, 2018 Share Posted November 3, 2018 No Brian ... Thats not what he wants to hear ... He wants the responsibility put totally on the shoulders of the Tory Government ... Your not playing ball ... Fella has history for politicising all sorts of stuff to make his anti-Tory point ... Like many I find it revolting Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bulletguy Posted November 3, 2018 Author Share Posted November 3, 2018 Brian Kirby - 2018-11-03 5:50 PM Bulletguy - 2018-11-02 8:43 PM ……………………..I realise the entrance isn't the only escape....but was a means of in an emergency, though certainly didn't help being so tiny. Shoddy design ill thought out imo Brian. Probably cost peanuts to build but with the sole purpose of making vast profits. I think you’re using today’s knowledge to judge the past! ?? The building was commissioned by the Douglas Corporation in the early 60’s, and designed by a local architect with no experience of such buildings. He could not have had that experience, as his concept for the building was new and untried. It is easy to identify its actual shortcomings in hindsight, but I doubt anyone could have foreseen them at the time. No not at all Brian. In fact if you read my reply to Colins post you'd see i quoted an example of shoddy building and poor design......one of the blocks at the factory i used to work which suffered badly from rain pouring through the roof. That was designed and built in the 70's and opened by Prince Philip. The other blocks were all pre-war and none suffered flooding through the roof, so as i said to Colin,....what was it we knew about building properly back in the late 30's, that we didn't know in the 70's? Perhaps our 70's block building was 'designed' by the same architect then as whoever drew it up certainly could have learned a thing or two from studying the old builds we had. Which was it that got reduced from 300+ pages to 26? I thought it was Approved Document B? Or was it the entire building regs? Either way it seems pretty severe.……………………………… I have no idea what that comment referred to. I quoted the actual regulation on flame spread over external walls above. As I said, the relevant volume of Approved Document B Fire alone is 166 pages. Found it now by looking back on iPlayer. It's at 17min 40sec in about how Thatcher cut over 300 pages of building regs and reduced it down to just 26 pages in an effort to "cut red tape". Missed that, but I have no idea which regulations those might have been. I suspect the 26 pages is probably a reference to the Building Regulations, introduced under the 1984 Building Act. It is probably a reference to SI 2214, the latest version of which is 2010, at 55 pages long. Those are the actual regulations applicable to the refurbishment of Grenfell. Worth going back on via iplayer if you want to. I think the Grenfell fire was more than avoidable, I think it was legally impossible. I think that the responsibility lies almost exclusively with RBKC, with central government sharing some of the blame. RKBC is a larger, better resourced borough than was Douglas in the 1960’s. It has more, better informed, staff, yet seems not to have used them, or possibly not listened to them. I remain incredulous that the materials used at Grenfell were permitted or, if not permitted, that inferior substitutes were used and not spotted. For me, all the other issues are secondary. Without that disastrous combination of cladding and insulation, notwithstanding the other safety deficiencies, I really don’t think the initial fire could have spread from the flat where it started. Based on what I have read so far, I’m absolutely clear that it was the insulated cladding, and that alone, that allowed the fire to envelop the building as it did. Echoing my thoughts exactly. It was a powder keg of failures and utter insanity to then go and wrap the damn thing in that cladding which simply 'stoked' a horrendous fire to be that claimed the lives of 72 people. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Brian Kirby Posted November 3, 2018 Share Posted November 3, 2018 Fund this, which you may find interesting. Quite a few things I wasn't aware of, from which it seems one of the architects involved was rather more sophisticated than I had hitherto understood. It's a bit of a tale of cock-up after cock-up. See what you think. :-) http://tinyurl.com/ydc8uwo4 Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest pelmetman Posted November 3, 2018 Share Posted November 3, 2018 antony1969 - 2018-11-03 6:07 PM No Brian ... Thats not what he wants to hear ... He wants the responsibility put totally on the shoulders of the Tory Government ... Your not playing ball ... Fella has history for politicising all sorts of stuff to make his anti-Tory point ... Like many I find it revolting Brian's got a fellow Remoaner pretending to have a intellectual conversation ;-) ....... He'll learn the error of his way's eventually :D ........ Or he'll become a Corbynite 8-) ....... Watch Out ....Watch Out.......The Body Snatchers......Are About >:-) ........ Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bulletguy Posted November 3, 2018 Author Share Posted November 3, 2018 Brian Kirby - 2018-11-03 7:11 PM Found this, which you may find interesting. Quite a few things I wasn't aware of, from which it seems one of the architects involved was rather more sophisticated than I had hitherto understood. It's a bit of a tale of cock-up after cock-up. See what you think. :-) http://tinyurl.com/ydc8uwo4 Jesus God 8-) A whole litany of failures, gross incompetence, and frighteningly crass 'management' fueled by nothing but sheer greed with zero regard for safety. It goes from bad to worse all the way through. Waiver after waiver and much ducking, diving and wriggling out of fire codes and structural precautions against disaster. A very apt prediction in their silly sales blurb....."Summerland would "set the architectural world alight". Oh brother...yeah it certainly delivered on that! *-) :-( Interesting what Oroglas manufacturers, Rohm and Haas, had to say about it's use on a building too and that their information on the product should have been provided to Mr. Pearson, the island's chief fire officer, but was not. Complete blatant disregard for Isle of Man by-law 39 too......so how the hell did that ugly slab of junk ever get built in the first place? How many pockets were being 'patted' i wonder? :-( Of the vastly insufficient number of exits from the building, several were locked, including two of the main entrance doors and one fire exit immediately adjacent: some of these could be battered open, as the doors into the Aquadrome were, and some could not. Jesus wept. :-( And did this remind you of anything? Eyewitness accounts agree that the fire spread incredibly rapidly--"as if the place had been doused with petrol," "like a bomb," "worse than the Blitz," "within ten seconds the whole place was on fire," "like wildfire," "the building went up like paper and was wrecked in no time at all." I was both shocked and disgusted at the conclusion of the Summerland report and sadly it seems the Grenfell one has gone the same way. Utterly shameful and complete disrespect. However; "The Corporate Manslaughter Act of 2007-- a result of unsuccessful prosecutions in cases of disaster -- means that if anything like Summerland ever happens again, it would be possible to find the management of the building liable. That's fine and admirable......but let's start at the very top first and then work down. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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